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Introduction
Conspicuous in the SADC’s land issue is the contestation among stakeholders for the status of 
“ultimate victim”. This is  not unique to this particular problem. Whenever disputes arise, 
stakeholders  almost  always  immediately  begin  campaigning  for  the  status  of  “ultimate 
victim”.   Those that clinch that status always appear to gain public pity. More importantly, 
they gain moral, economic, emotional and other forms of desirable support from significant 
others. Contests are by their nature resource-intensive and energy depleting. A State whose 
citizens’ finite energy and resources are arrested in social conflict significantly reduces its 
opportunity to engage in other welfare-enhancing projects.  It is unfortunate that developing 
countries that most need to utilise their overall finite human, economic and political resources 
to better their lot find themselves locked up in fierce civil strife. Even more unfortunate is the 
appearance  of  lethargy  among  their  leaders  about  how best  to  arrest  and  efficiently  and 
constructively resolve the disputes. Profound outcomes are left to chance as legal standards 
are either simply abandoned or ignored. Vagrancy is either sanctioned or acquiesced with by 
government, superseding the law and other strategies long recognised by civilised society as 
the preferred means of curing social injustices. Consequently, chaos and fear take over as the 
predominant architects of land policy in what are essentially agrarian economies. Because of 
what  appears  to  be  an  absence  in  most  of  these  disputes  of  a  deliberate  constructive 
governmental engagement with the dynamics of the problem, the outcome, and to varying 
degrees, is often that everyone is weakened by the conflict. In the end, few could claim to 
have benefited from these conflicts. For instance, following on directly from the trigger of the 
land crisis, the average Zimbabwean now faces hyper-inflation resulting in a spiralling cost of 
living;  shortages  of  essential  basic  commodities  like  paraffin  and  medicines;  transport 
disruptions due to fuel shortages which are also crippling businesses at all levels; interference 
with basic human rights such as the freedom of speech, the right to strike, and freedom of 
association;  an  absence of  effective  law enforcement;  a  chronic  lack  of  foreign  currency 
attributable to economic mismanagement; destruction of personal property; the daily fear of 
violence, intimidation and actual death.1  Zimbabwe’s economy has topped the world’s fastest 
shrinking  economy for  some  time  now and is  now said  to  be  in  freefall.2 Although  the 
government puts inflation at 140 per cent, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts 
that  it  is  set  to  reach  500  per  cent  in  2003.  Although  the  official  exchange  rate  is  55 
Zimbabwe dollars to the US dollar, the unofficial rate is 30 times that, around 1700. The 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industry says the country needs 2 million metric tonnes of maize 
per year, but this year has produced just one quarter of that, 500,000 tons. This is a dramatic, 
even drastic change in fortunes for a country that once enjoyed the prestigious title of “bread 
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basket of Africa” and exported food products of the highest quality to the European Union, 
amongst other international markets.
Criminology  has  developed  a  whole  new area  of  study  that  focuses  on  victims’ 
concerns and rights – victimology. Radical victimology3 concerns itself with victims of police 
force action, war, the correctional system, State violence and oppression of any kind. It asks 
what the victim represents and symbolises in the criminal justice system. It is a useful tool in 
the evaluation of the risk and effect of crime on citizens. Therefore, the land distribution 
based  crises  unfolding  in  affected  SADC  States  are  of  significant  interest  to  radical 
victimology not least because both President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Nujoma of 
Namibia regard the land issue as a matter of war against colonial vestiges in their respective 
countries.  Inaugurating  his  new  cabinet  in  August  2002  after  an  unexpected  earlier 
dissolution,  President  Mugabe  referred  to  it  as  a  “war  council”  designed  to  resolve  the 
country’s political and economic problems. He also described the cabinet as a political war 
cabinet, which would take into account actions being done by Britain and its allies against 
Zimbabwe.4 On 10 October,  President  Nujoma not  only sacked his Prime Minister  of  12 
years,  but also threatened “arrogant white farmers” with stringent land reform proposals.5 
About 4,000, mostly white, commercial farmers own just under half the arable land. Speaking 
at  the  opening  of  the  final  three-day  session  of  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable 
Development,  the  Namibian  President  accused  the  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  of 
creating the land crisis in Zimbabwe6 - a dark omen for the future of Namibia’s agricultural 
industry.  In  South  Africa,  those  agitating  for  equitable  land  redistribution  place  the 
landlessness of peasants whose livelihood is dependent directly upon ownership of land on 
the doorstep of racism and an indifferent post apartheid government.7 
Positivist victimology specializes in interpersonal crimes of violence. In particular, it 
is  concerned  with  identification  of  factors  that  contribute  to  a  non-random  pattern  of 
victimisation  and  to  identification  of  victims  that  may  have  contributed  to  their  own 
victimization.  Affected  States  of  the  SADC  States  have  victims  that  are  of  interest  to 
positivist victimology because there is a sense in which stakeholders in the land issue are 
agents to their  own victimhood.  Therefore,  both the positivist  and radical  perspectives of 
victimology  could  inform  on  the  effort  juridically  to  understand  the  contest  among 
stakeholders for the status of ‘ultimate victim’. Labels intended to justify, sympathise with 
and to condemn others are evident in the struggle for the coveted label of ‘ultimate victim’. 
These include squatter, settler, donor, corrupt, crony, immoral, illegal and dictator. 
This article examines the motivations and dynamics of this contest and its probable 
impact on the resolution of the land issue. More importantly, it seeks to determine the value 
of this contest to any strategy that consciously may be adopted in the effort juridically to 
resolve the land issue in affected SADC States. It argues that conceptions of victimology that 
do not incorporate in their analyses the mischief sought to be cured in the land issue are not 
particularly  helpful  in  the  effort  to  discover  efficient  models  for  the  resolution  of  such 
conflicts. The view that constructive use of disputes occurs best when those originally and 
3 See Rock, P. (1994) Victimology, Dartmouth, Aldershot; Mawby, R.I and Walklate, S. (1994) Critical 
Victimology, Sage Publications, London; Lamb, S. (1999) New Versions of Victims: Feminists 
struggle with the concept, New York University Press; Haag, P. (1999) Consent: Sexual Rights and the 
Transformation of American Liberalism, Cornell University Press; McShane, M.D. and Williams, F.P. 
III (1992) “Radical Victimology: A Critique of the Concept of Victim in Traditional Victimology, 
Crime & Delinquency, vol. 38 No.2 pp.258-51; Friedrichs, D. (1983) “Victimology: A Consideration 
of the radical Critique”, Crime & Delinquency, vol. 29 pp.283-94; Elias, R. (1986) The Politics of 
Victimisation, Oxford University Press.
4 See “Mugabe swears in war cabinet”, http://www.news24.com/News24/Zimbabwe/0,1113,2-
259_1247732,00.html (visited 20/11/2002)
5 See “What Mugabe Does, Nujoma Can Do Better”, The Financial Gazette (Harare) at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210110464.html (visited 20/11/02)
6 See “Nujoma broadsides Blair”, http://www.news24.com/News24/WorldSummit/0,5733,2-
1381_1251257,00.html (visited 20/11/02) 
7 See “Brutal clampdown on fundamental freedoms of Landless People on the eve of the WSSD!” at 
http://www.nlc.co.za/wssd/press0222augbrutal.htm (visited 21/11/02)
2
directly  involved  in  the  conflict  actively  participate  in  the  discovery  of  the  solution  is 
examined. The SADC land issue has great potential to inform discourse on the form and 
content of strategies that could be applied gainfully to resolve social disputes that are rooted 
in  injustices  connected  to  colonial  experience  of  the  affected  State.  Because  all  disputes 
reflect  notions  of  aggressor  and  victim,  victimology’s  approach  to  conflict  resolution  is 
crucial to this analysis. Failure to take account of victims’ perceived injustices against them 
may  serve  only  to  perpetuate  the  mischief  at  the  core  of  the  land  issue.  Therefore, 
determination of the full range of victims appears critical to a resolution of the land issue 
because those that are ascribed with victim status also appropriate whatever value attaches to 
that status while those denied it are left morally bankrupt. This is important not least because 
in all societies, a good name is better than wealth. And where wealth is at issue, the victim 
then becomes entitled to some of it or at the very least, to compensation for loss of it.
To  the  extent  that  they  inform  on  the  form  and  content  of  the  strategies  that 
eventually may be deployed to advance social understanding and handling of property related 
social conflict, conceptions of victimology that target preservation of the inherent dignity of 
all  stakeholders  in  land  disputes  should  be  applied.  Failure  to  account  for  that  universal 
inherent dignity may serve only to perpetuate the mischief at the core of the land issue in that 
those labelled as “victims” will appropriate all the value associated with that label while those 
denied  it  are  exposed  to  social  condemnation  and  even  rejection.  This  calls  also  for  an 
understanding of the victim’s assigned role in the legal systems of affected SADC States; the 
use  and  abuse  of  victims  by  the  politico-economic  system;  the  criminal  justice  system, 
politicians; and the media.
Disputes as Property
Criminologists have long argued that professionals steal disputes from the parties directly 
involved.8 Christies9 singles out lawyers for this criticism and argues that because they are 
trained to prevent and solve disputes and to agree among themselves on what is relevant in a 
case, they have a trained incapacity to let the parties decide what they think is relevant. One 
consequence of this is that political debates are almost impossible to stage in Courts. Thus, 
the  case  of  the  small  thief  and  the  big  house-owner  never  fully  tackles  the  issue  of 
blameworthiness. 
The “theft” of disputes by lawyers alleged above is interesting for several reasons. To 
the extent that it can be proved, it raises the question whether the law merits the priority that it 
currently enjoys as the primary tool for settling serious disputes in most societies particularly 
because of its alleged sponsorship and protection of “theft”. Secondly, if disputes are regarded 
as property, then the very fact that officers of the Courts are stealing suggests that they have 
in some cases a more serious case to answer than their clients. Property, any property for that 
matter has a measure of value. The property owner’s subjective value of his/her property is 
more important than any objective measure that may be applied to it. This so especially where 
the  property  owner  is  unwilling  to  exchange  for  anything,  his/her  particular  property. 
Therefore, “… conflict itself that represents the most interesting property taken away, not the 
goods originally taken away from the victim, or given back to him. In our types of society, 
disputes  are  scarcer  than  property.  And  they  are  immensely  valuable”.10 However,  this 
appears  inevitable  given that  societies appear  to  have established professionally  managed 
systems for the specific purpose of resolving disputes.  The weaknesses complained about 
social ordering processes run by established professionals that appear to some to dominate 
those directly involved in the conflict are perhaps outweighed by the outright benefit that they 
bestow, i.e. prevention of resort to blood feuds – primitive man’s common way of resolving 
disputes. Therefore, the value of the conflict itself is expressed in the disputants’ ability to 
8 See Christie, Nils, (1977)  “Conflict as Property”, The British Journal of Criminology, vol.17 No.1 
pp.1-15.
9 Ibid. p.8.
10 Ibid. p.7.
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mobilise  legal  and  moral  opinion  in  their  favour.  However,  victimologists  insist  that 
disputants are concerned more with ensuring that resolution process is not monopolised by 
professionals. They appear to ignore the fact that just as the physician is probably the person 
most suited to cut open the breast plate of a man whose heart is need of a triple by-pass 
operation whilst the patient himself is completely disabled under general anaesthetic, so too 
must  disputants  sometimes  passively  defer  to  legal  professionals.  The  argument  that 
participation  is  also  a  scarce  commodity  exploited  by  professional  insiders  to  create 
monopolies against  outsiders11 does not  easily square up to the purpose test  according to 
which the intention and objects behind adoption of a resolution strategy must be given effect 
whenever resort is had to that strategy. This is such a strict test so that even where a statutory 
instrument confers a wide discretion on an authority, it may not adopt policies or practices 
that are not authorised by that Statute. In Padfield v Minister of Agriculture 12 the Minister of 
Agriculture refused to direct a complaint to the committee of investigation, claiming that he 
had unfettered statutory discretion in determining whether or not to refer such complaints. 
The Agricultural Marketing Act 1958 provided for a milk marketing scheme which included a 
complaints procedure by which a committee of investigation examined any complaint made 
about the operation of the scheme ‘if the Minister in any case so directs’.  It was held by the 
House of Lords that:
1) the Minister would be directed to deal with the complaint according to law;
2) the reasons given by the Minister for his refusal were not good reasons in law and 
showed  that  he  had  not  exercised  his  discretion  in  a  manner  that  promoted  the 
intention and objects of the specific Act
3) the policy and objects of the Act must be determined by construing the Act as a 
whole, and construction is always a matter of law for the Court to determine.
If  judicial  practice  of  resolving  disputes  assumes  that  trained  professionals  will  apply  a 
particular  science,  and  clients  or  users  of  that  dispute  resolution  strategy  will  use  legal 
representatives trained in the operation of that science in order to make their cases, to then 
label as ‘thieves’ of disputes that belong to others the lawyers that are operating as envisaged 
by the judicial process is to oppose the intention and object of judicial courts. Governments 
habitually invest huge resources into the training of professionals and experts that run and 
service our judicial systems. Further, States habitually incur huge costs in the running and 
maintenance of buildings and other resources used by these professionals and experts only 
because  society  has  selected  judicial  resolution  of  disputes  ahead  of  its  rival  strategies. 
Arguments  for  substituting  Barotse  Law  type  judicial  approaches  for  the  professionally 
managed ones because of the perceived advantage that the former approach confers on those 
directly involved in the dispute, i.e. opportunity to participate fully in the effort to discover a 
solution, are problematic for three reasons.  
First,  the greater  participation of those directly involved in  the  conflict  is  said to 
obtain from the procedural possibility of the parties to refer to a chain of old complaints and 
arguments each time they present their case. However, that is a mere possibility and not a 
guarantee. There is no means of telling or even ensuring that parties to a dispute necessarily 
exploit that possibility to equal advantage. If inequity in direct participation by those directly 
involved in the conflict is the mischief that was sought to be cured, there is no means of 
telling what tangible benefits it actually confers to the resolution process. 
Secondly, the Barotse approach appears unworkable for the highly mechanised and 
very litigious modern societies. Gluckman13 writes that Lozi trials were premised on the view 
that because almost all of a person’s relationships exist in his positions in the political and 
kinship systems, “… a litigant in many cases arising from these multiplex relationships comes 
11 Ibid. p.15.
12 [1968]AC 997
13 See Gluckman, M. (2nd edn. 1967) The Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Nothern Rhodesia 
(Zambia), Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.23.
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to Court not as a right-and-duty bearing persona, but in terms of his total social personality”. 
Thus, in most disputes, 
… a person is not involved merely as buyer, seller, lessor, lessee, landowner, the injured party 
and the wrongdoer – briefly, the plaintiff and the defendant, the complainant and the accused 
– but he is involved as an individual in specific relationships with a whole set of other people. 
In administering the law the judges consider these total relationships, not only the relations 
between right-and-duty  bearing  units.  But  concepts  of  these  units  exist  as  nuclei  for  the 
substantive law. 
While  the  Barotse  approach  to  dispute  settlement  may  have  sufficed  for  the  small 
communities of 1600 to 1800 Barotseland14 or Northern Rhodesia (now named Zambia) it 
would  most  probably  be  prohibitively  lengthy,  expensive  and  inefficient  in  modern  day 
Zambia. The backlog of cases would make the justice system an unattractive candidate for 
dispute resolution. 
Thirdly, it simply is not correct to say that professionals steal disputes. Law reports 
and even newspaper reports always identify the cases that they report by the names of the 
participants and never by the names of their representatives. In criminal cases, it is always 
The State (in England - Regina) v Y (the alleged offender). In civil law cases, it is always the 
names  of  the  parties  directly  involved  that  identify  the  case  being  reported.  Hiring  of 
professionals that assist parties navigate the judicial examination of their case through the 
supposedly objective standards of legal science is itself an intelligent acknowledgment by the 
parties that while they wish to press on with the merits of their case, they individually lack 
knowledge of the legal science at work required to either prosecute or defend their case. That 
they  employ  legal  professionals  to  act  on  their  behalf  is  strategic  intelligence,  and  not 
hopeless surrender to some masquerading bunch of criminals. Therefore, to suggest that this 
decision of the parties to engage professionals amounts to a dispossession of their conflict is 
to lose focus of the real power dynamic at issue in disputes, i.e. the competition by those 
directly involved in disputes for labels that may be immediately or eventually conferred by 
the  public,  media,  law  courts.   In  the  UK at  least,  newspapers  that  have  hurriedly  and 
recklessly awarded the label of victim to a party directly involved in a dispute while judicial 
proceedings were in progress have incurred the wrath of the Courts which imposed hefty fines 
for  contempt  of  court,  and  jurors  dismissed,  trial  proceedings  halted  and  the  case  either 
thrown out or fresh proceedings commenced where that was still possible. The jury in the 
case of two Leeds United footballers accused of attacking a student was discharged following 
the publication of a prejudicial newspaper article by the Sunday Mirror. The newspaper itself 
was then ordered to pay £175,000 in fines and costs for publishing the story that resulted in 
the collapse of the first trial in 2001 of Leeds United Football stars Jonathan Woodgate and 
Lee Bowyer. In the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court, Lord Justice Kennedy, sitting 
with Mrs Justice Rafferty, stated that the timing and content of the article had been “such as 
to  imperil  a  lengthy,  expensive,  high-profile  and  difficult  trial  at  a  difficult  time”.15 By 
presenting to its readership the view that one particular party to the dispute was a “victim” the 
The Sunday Mirror appeared not only to have usurped the Court’s prerogative to determine 
the guilt or innocence of the accused, but also empowered one party to the conflict, i.e. the 
“victim”, and morally bankrupted the other, i.e. the accused. This, without applying the legal 
science that the British society has elected as its principal means for determining the guilt or 
innocence  of  parties  to  disputes.  In  1947,  the  Evening  Standard  was  fined  £40,000  plus 
£50,000  legal  costs  for  revealing  that  three  of  the  six  men  on  trial  for  an  escape  from 
14 See ibid., pp.1-34.
15 HM Attorney General v MGN Ltd. [2002] EWHC 907 (Admin) “Newspapaer fined for contempt”, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1938765.stm (visited 05/11/02). In this connection see also Attorney 
General v. Punch Ltd and Another [2001] Q.B. 1028 [2001] EWCA Civ 403 CA; Ashworth Hospital 
Authority v. MGN Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 36 [2002] UKHL 29 HL; R. v. Ex parte Telegraph Group Plc 
[2002] E.M.L.R. 10 CA (Crim Div).
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Whitemoor Prison were convicted IRA terrorists.16 The newspaper appeared to have profaned 
the rule under British law that a jury decides the case on the relevant facts and not on the 
history of the accused. By disclosing the unhelpful record of the accused, the newspaper had 
morally bankrupted the accused and strengthened the prosecutor’s case.
 This underlines the danger of attaching labels on those directly involved in disputes 
ahead of the resolution of their disputes. Yet participants are reluctant to wait until the dispute 
is resolved to label themselves one way or the other. In fact they are eager from the outset to 
gain recognition as victims. This is curious. McShane and Williams17 cite criminal justice 
systems’ indifference to victims as the main cause. Prior to the moment of law, victims and 
their relatives determined the essence of the harm done to them and controlled both the extent 
of retribution and the extent of their satisfaction with the sanction suffered by the offending 
party. But from the moment of law, the role of the victim began to diminish. Introduction of 
concepts such as the “King’s Peace”, “Public nuisance”, “Public disorder”, etc. reinforced 
central authority and enthroned the State as the victim of offences against the individual. 
While individual victims still showed up to testify at trials, they were no longer the accusers 
and prosecutors that brought the offender to justice. Instead they served merely to provide 
emotional credibility to the prosecution’s case. This modification of the victim’s role from 
that of arbiter to a mere evidentiary object in the State’s mission against the person accused of 
breaching State law(s) often leaves the victim’s sense of harm untouched and unjustified. 
Victims’ sense of neglect by the justice system may even compound their sense of harm. 
Acknowledgment of their sense of harm that is free from the impersonal and distant justice 
system is hoped to give a better sense of victim satisfaction.
  Those to whom the pleas for recognition as victims are directed are only too ready to 
make  their  minds  up  about  whom  the  real  victims  are.  But  this  has  the  effect  also  of 
predisposing the concept of victim as the revelatory voice of experience. Herbele18 writes that 
such a conception of victim naturalises and individualises the experience of violence rather 
than  politicise  it  as  an  effect  of  power  and  cultural  norms.  Evident  in  the  land  disputes 
unfolding in the SADC is the collective position being adopted by parties to the conflict and 
not individual ones. Cases that have been brought before the High Court of Zimbabwe since 
the  outbreak  of  land  related  disputes  demonstrate  this.19 Abroad,  appeals  for  financial 
assistance by both the government of Zimbabwe and the Commercial Farmers Union tended 
to  emphasise  the  group  rather  than  the  individual  nature  of  the  parties.  The  collective 
positions adopted by those directly involved in the land conflict seek to justify the conflict 
and  its  ends  –  whoever  prevails,  rather  than  escape  from  the  conflict  and  collectively 
deconstruct it with a view to discovering a constructive and coherent humanitarian approach 
that recognises that all those directly involved in the conflict have legitimate interests that 
violence  and  wanton  destruction  occurring  in  Zimbabwe  for  instance  do  not  serve.  The 
biggest issue in any conflict is not the spoils to be gotten. That view reduces human beings to 
prize-seekers. Rather it is recognition as “ultimate victim” by those whose opinion matters to 
the parties. Much of human activity has nothing to do with ultimate prizes. Self-actualised20 
persons like Ghandi, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr.  are characterised more by 
their altruistic service to all of humanity than by any individual prizes they clinched purely for 
material  gain.  Therefore,  the  importance  to  an  examination  of  the  land  issue  in  affected 
SADC States of  the corresponding battle  for  the status of  “ultimate victim” among those 
directly involved in the dispute is critical to any attempt to appraise and evaluate the problem. 
The  importance  of  labels  to  discourse  on  conflict  resolution  challenges  criminology’s 
apparent  recklessness  in  labelling  as  “thieves”  of  disputes  professionals  that  assist  those 
16 See BBC News (2001) “Q & A: Journalist in contempt”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1268966.stm 
(visited 06/11/02).
17 McShane, M.D. and Williams, F.P. III (1992) “Radical Victimology: A Critique of the Concept of 
Victim in Traditional Victimology, Crime & Delinquency, vol. 38 No.2 pp.258 at 260.
18 Heberle, R, (2002) “Victimisation and Consent” Hypatia vol. 17 No.3 pp.257-64 at 258.
19 See note 28.
20 A concept discussed in Maslow’s theory of motivation. See Atikinson et al. (10th edn. 1999) 
Introduction to Psychology, pp.524-6.
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directly involved in a conflict in working out feasible solutions to their problems. Moreover, 
in most common law jurisdictions, the crime of theft involves appropriation by x of property 
belonging  to  y  with  the  intention  permanently  to  deprive  him  of  that  property.21 Legal 
representatives do not as matter of course appropriate disputes permanently to the exclusion 
of their clients. Their only role is to advise their clients who retain responsibility for both the 
conduct and outcome of their dispute.
Agency and Passivity in the construction of labels
The dualism of victim/agent which liberal legalism and culture appears to privilege over all 
else in its examination of issues of sexuality and sexual experience of women is sometimes 
accused of oppressive conduct towards women particularly because it affords them only two 
options through which to express themselves as public figures. The first is as innocent sexual 
victims.  The  second  is  as  rational  and  therefore  probably  guilty  sexual  agents.  But  this 
abstract liberal dualism of victim/agent obviously misrepresents issues of sexuality and sexual 
experience and inhibits progress toward achieving sexual freedom.22 The question is whether 
similar dualism might colour the liberal press and the liberal world’s view of whom among 
those jockeying for the status of “ultimate victim” in the land issue in affected SADC States 
actually is a victim and who is not?
The public arena provides the theatre in which disputes are fought out. Logically, it is 
the place where pursuit of the coveted label of “ultimate victim” is evidenced. Technological 
gains of the last century have removed national monopoly on public issues of an international 
character and extended their reach to an international audience that is ever ready to engage in 
one way or another those directly involved or affected in disputes. Across a whole range of 
activities,  the Internet  is  arguably the world’s  most  common meeting place  today.  It  has 
become  a  potent  tool  for  those  keen  to  mobilise  local  and  international  shame  against 
whatever is opposed. Throughout Zimbabwe’s land crisis the Commercial Farmers Union of 
Zimbabwe has used its website even to publicise judicial decisions of Zimbabwean Courts in 
which it was a party. This had the positive effect of alerting the world about the plight of 
Zimbabwe’s  commercial  farming  community  and  apparent  human  rights  abuse  of  the 
Zimbabwe government. More importantly, it had the effect of persuading both the local and 
international liberals that Zimbabwe’s commercial farmers were the indisputable victims of 
an autocratic and racist  regime. The commercial farmers appeared as victims that had no 
government to enforce their legally recognised rights even as reaffirmed by their own national 
courts.23 The National Land Committee (NLC),24 a South Africa based organisation utilises its 
website to mobilise shame against the landlessness of the majority of land-starved peasants 
against  the  backdrop  of  an  abundance  of  unused  land  confined  in  the  hands  of  a  few 
commercial  farmers.  Well-researched  papers,  interviews,  reports  and  stinging  posters  are 
placed on this website. Together, they appear to portray the landless black peasant community 
as the ultimate victim of South Africa’s entrenched policies of segregation in that they have 
not  got  similar  opportunities  as  their  white  counterparts  to  own  prime  farmland.  The 
commercial farmer is portrayed not as a reluctant powerful beneficiary of the status quo, but 
as a co-conspirator with the government of the day to maintain apartheid’s former oppression 
of the peasant.  The NLC is a fierce campaigner for the case of the landless in South Africa.
With  immense  power  to  shrink  world  events  onto  our  television  screens  as  they 
unfold, and to engrave positions on our minds through the printed word of newspapers, and to 
whisper into our ears through radio broadcasts events that they select as news items, those in 
control of the liberal international media are very much involved in how we arrive at the 
21 Discussing the elements of the crime of theft see Smith J.C. and Hogan, B (6th edn 1990) Criminal 
Law, Butterworths, London, pp.490-530.
22 Heberle, R, (2002) “Victimisation and Consent” Hypatia vol. 17 No.3 pp.257-64.
23 See for example The Commercial Farmers Union v. Comrade Border Gezi and others, Case No. 
H.C. 3544/2000 http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/courtorder.htm (visited 10/11/02).
24 See http://www.nlc.co.za/ (visited 10/11/02)
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determination of victim/aggressor or agent/victim in every situation that is of interest to us 
individually and collectively. McShane and Williams25 write that the images that are passed 
on of the victim are composed largely of middle-class symbolism.
These images of the victim partake of an understanding of crime, and the criminal process, 
from a  distance.  They  cannot  appreciate  crime as  a  major  contributor  to  an underground 
economy, a relief from the frustrations of living without means in a property-oriented society, 
… For the middle class, the victim and offender are part of a strict dichotomy, a mutually 
exclusive set of categories. The offender cannot be viewed as a victim, nor can the victim be 
viewed as offender.
They write that the media interpretation of the victim requires a significant counteracting 
strategy on the part of the consumer because it is often an emotional presentation to which 
most citizens are vulnerable. “First stories show victims to be like you and me. Then the 
victimising event is described in sufficient detail to allow consumers to feel some small part 
of  what  the  victim endured.  This,  in  turn,  creates  an  identity  through shared  experience, 
bonding the consumer with the victim. The victim-story usually ends with how the victim’s 
life has been changed forever.”26
But the majority of those involved in the contest for the status of “ultimate victim” in 
the SADC land issue are mere peasants. Articulation of their concerns might be beyond or 
beneath the machine of middle-class symbolism and the liberal press’ interests. Therefore, the 
contest is a layered one. The concerns of the parties must match those of the liberal press that 
presents particularly to the universal public, the “issues underlying the conflict” and what is at 
stake. The party whose interests are ill-suited to the liberal press’ agenda risks being ignored. 
This appears to have given initial advantage to commercial farmers’ arguments in the contest 
for  the status of  “ultimate victim” because of  their proximity in class to the masters and 
purveyors  of  the liberal  press.  Zimbabwe’s land issue was often reported as a dangerous 
experiment with food security in the region, suggesting that access to land should remain the 
way it was because it ensured food security in both the country and the region. This ignored 
the  power  dynamic  associated  with  land  ownership  and  the  previous  and  continuing 
humiliation of the native population which was alienated from their  land and turned into 
squatters during colonial rule.  Therefore, parties must be creative enough to convince the 
liberal press that they share similar values - a complicated if not near impossible task for 
uneducated peasants whose interests are at stake in all of this.  This begs the question whether 
articulating this complex and multi-layered quality of the contest for the status of “ultimate 
victim” in the land issue is at all possible.  Nonetheless, those that volunteer to tell us about 
the  nature  of  the  victim in  land  disputes  perhaps  inadvertently  declare  themselves  to  be 
knowledgeable about this complexity, and about crime and the criminal process. Whether we 
escape  their  presumptive  approaches  to  the  subject  depends  on  how  skilful  we  are  at 
processing others’ subjective conceptions of victimology. Media coverage of the land conflict 
in the SADC is no exception. Therefore, the question must be asked to what extent each of the 
stakeholders jockeying for the status of “ultimate victim” is justified in so doing. Could they 
merely be creatively seeking to manipulate both the local and international public concern for 
the situation, in the service of anything but resolution of the land issue? If they are, then the 
role of a media that is sympathetic to their cause - whatever that may be, or alternatively, that 
of a hostile media, assumes prominence in the discourse and requires an analysis that goes 
beyond the victim/agency analysis particularly because of the limitations complained about 
that approach. 
25 McShane, M.D. and Williams, F.P. III (1992) “Radical Victimology: A Critique of the Concept of 
Victim in Traditional Victimology, Crime & Delinquency, vol. 38 No.2 pp.258-51 at p.261.
26 Ibid. p.267.
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Beyond the victim/agency analysis, Challenging Stakeholder claims of “ultimate victim” 
status
A major weakness in the victim/agency dynamic is that it sustains the mirror images of liberal 
legalism which views victims as hapless and in need of protection, or as rational agents that 
deserve what they get.  Caveat emptor, estoppel, consent, and capacity are only some of the 
legal  principles  commonly  used  to  countenance  the  mirror  image  approach  to  dispute 
resolution. If these principles were to be applied to the land issue in affected SADC states, the 
disputes would revert  to  purely contractual  matters.  The contract  law principle of  caveat  
emptor  obliges the buyer to beware of the legal sanctity of the title that he acquires in any 
transaction involving property. International law has developed standards for determining the 
sanctity  of  legal  claims.  Except  in  situations  where  the  colonial  authority  clearly  passed 
legislation that unambiguously extinguished all prior forms of titles to land and established 
completely new forms of land ownership and not a hybrid of the past and the new, native 
people’s claims to land now under private title of commercial farms subsists.27 The approach 
taken by colonial authorities in the SADC evidence the enduring existence of native claims to 
title to land because both the communal and private titles were recognised in German South 
West Africa, and Tanzania, and in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola where the policy of 
assimilado was employed both to maintain the line between primitive communal existence 
and to transfer native people’s status from “inferior native” to a form of equality with their 
colonial master if it could be shown that the native applicant’s style, taste and aspirations had 
changed from “primitive native” to “advanced western” ones. The British approach to the 
land question in  South Africa,  Southern Rhodesia,  Northern Rhodesia,  Nyasaland and its 
protectorates in the region of established new private titles to land and also sustained the old 
communal titles. It favours the view that native claims to land that later became established as 
commercial farms persist to this day. This flexibility of international law to recognise that 
which appeared to have been superseded by another era over a considerably long period of 
time is inconsistent with its rigidity in rejecting under the doctrine of uti posidetis that, State 
boundaries  arbitrarily  drawn  up  by  the  empire  nations  in  1884  could  be  redrawn  after 
independence  in  order  to  take  account  of  kinship  ties  that  had  been  violated  earlier. 
Nevertheless, taken in this context the construction of the victim as hapless appears to be the 
mirror image of the construction of the victim as the manipulative agent who gets what he 
deserves. Had he thoroughly investigated the sanctity of the title to land that he is now being 
forced off, he would not have to suffer his current loss. He took the risk, and the benefits of it 
while it flourished, he must be bold enough to take the downside of that risk too, and not now 
cry foul. But that approach is contrary to the inherent dignity principle in that it is contingent 
upon what happened at about the time of colonisation only. Only the person violated then 
deserves retribution. In human affairs, every moment is as significant as any other. Failure to 
realise that encourages the exchange of severe thunderbolts among those directly involved in 
disputes because the sum of the whole is perceived to be greater than the whole. This fallacy 
potentially can sleepwalk nations into disasters that are sometimes irreparable. 
There is not one, but a series of victims in the land issue affecting the SADC. To stop 
the camera at a particular moment in time and decide that that was the critical moment on 
which resolution of the land issue should be based appears unreasonable because if it could be 
proved that commercial farmers that hold nearly all the land most suitable for agricultural 
production had incontestable claims, then it might also be said that landless peasants would 
then be condemned to landlessness, a position taken by the High Court of Zimbabwe in The 
Commercial Farmers Union v. Comrade Border Gezi and others.28 This would not enhance 
their  inherent  dignity  as human beings  precisely because they would be reduced to mere 
squatters that depended on the charity if any, of the commercial farmers who have already 
shown that they do not wish to have much if anything at all, to do with people that they call 
27 See Chigara, B. (2001) “From Oral to Recorded Governance: Reconstructing title to Real Property in 
21st Century Zimbabwe”, Common Law World Review, vol. 30 No.1 pp.36-65. 
28 Case No. H.C. 3544/2000 HE. See http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/courtorder.htm 
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“squatters”. Besides the conception of crime as “self-help” advocated by some criminologists 
prefers  the  moving picture  analysis  of  the offender/victim relationship.  By regarding this 
relationship as an ongoing dynamic, it is possible to realise that one of the actors may be 
taking retribution on the other actor for an earlier victimisation. “At that particular point, the 
earlier victim becomes the present offender and the earlier offender the present victim. If the 
interaction  continues,  the  positions  may  again  be  exchanged.”29 This  conception  of  the 
victim/offender dynamic is typical of the dynamic among those directly involved in the land 
conflict in affected SADC States. At colonisation, whites drove off native people from land 
that they had lived off from time immemorial, designated it private commercial farmland and 
condemned blacks to a life of misery in semi-desert land.  In the current disputes, the reverse 
is taking place. Therefore, the simplistic middle-class framework of pure, innocent victims 
and unjustified, irrational offenders is inapplicable. But according to McShane and Williams, 
“middle-class citizens may have difficulty in conceiving of a system where offenders and 
victims  trade  places  as  they  act,  react,  and  retaliate  in  an  emergent  drama  of  the  sort 
commonly  played  in  lower-class  communities”.30 They  conclude  therefore  that  the 
stereotypical  victim/offender  dichotomy  is  simply  not  capable  of  incorporating  the  true 
complexity of crime even if such versions are dominant among the public and the media.31 
That dichotomy fails to account in disputes such as the land issue in the SADC for present 
and continuing social injustices that are rooted in colonial experience of affected States. It 
fails also to protect the inherent dignity of all those directly involved in the conflict because it 
enables  shame  and  humiliation  to  be  used  as  a  tool  of  the  conflict.  All  human  rights 
instruments call for the “respect” and not “humiliation” of human dignity.
Access to land as the basis of human dignity in agrarian economies where the majority 
of the population live off the land itself
Cecil John Rhodes’ colonisation of Southern Rhodesia, later Rhodesia, and now Zimbabwe 
was inspired by the  need to  replicate  the  diamond and gold success  at  Kimberly further 
northwards. Rightly or wrongly, prospectors had reported that “… the whole country between 
Khama’s dominions, the Zambezi in the north and Gazaland in the East, was enormously 
fertile. Mashonaland moreover contained ‘some of the richest deposits of alluvial gold in the 
world’ – utter nonsense in fact, but credible enough in the light of explorers’ reports which 
were  reaching  the  Administrator”.32 The  pioneers  soon  found  that  the  territory’s  diverse 
mineral resources though not to be compared with its southern neighbour were no match to its 
fine climate, fertile soils and good rainfall. Thus, Southern Rhodesia’s agricultural potential 
became an immediate issue, and remains so to this  day.  Throughout  its  history,  land has 
remained the most important political and economic issue in Zimbabwe. Successive colonial 
legislation served to expropriate the most fertile territories with the most agricultural potential 
from native blacks that had lived off them from time immemorial and confine them in the 
hands of white commercial farmers. Table 1 shows the approximate apportionment of land in 
Southern Rhodesia on the eve of World War I in 1914. This table shows that even in this early 
period, only 3% of the population (whites) controlled 75% of the economically productive 
land while 97% (black peasants) were confined to 23% of the land scattered into a number of 
reserves.33 Zimbabwe’s total land area is an estimated 39 million hectares.  Approximately 
33.3 million hectares are suitable for agricultural purposes. About 6 million hectares have 
been reserved for National parks as well as Wildlife and Urban settlements. At independence 
in 1980, agricultural land was divided along racial lines as follows: 6,000 white large-scale 
29 See McShane, M.D. and Williams, F.P. III (1992) “Radical Victimology: A Critique of the Concept 
of Victim in Traditional Victimology, Crime & Delinquency, vol. 38 No.2 pp.258-51 at p.261.
30 Ibid. p.262.
31 Ibid.
32 Gann, L.G. (1965) A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early days to 1934, Chatto & Windus, London, 
p.68
33 See http://www.gta.gov.zw/Land%20Issues/factsheet.htm (visited 15/11/02)
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commercial farmers controlled about 15.5 million hectares almost half the total agricultural 
land in the country. 840,000 communal area farmers controlled about 16.4 million hectares34 
situated in the less fertile, low rainfall, semi-desert areas of the country.
Category Land held
Africans 24,000,000 acres
The BSAC35
48,000,000 acres
Individual white settlers 13,000,000 acres
Other Private Companies  9,000,000 acres
During this period, the country’s 
population size  was:
African Population 836,000
Whites   28,000
Table 1: Approximate allocation of land in Southern Rhodesia at the eve of World War I
(i)  Mugabe, victim or villain
In the Opening Speech to the Lancaster House talks on the future constitution of Rhodesia, 
the Patriotic Front listed the land question among its nine major issues for negotiation. The 
Lancaster House Conference nearly broke-down over the land question. The Patriotic Front 
wanted the British government to provide money to pay compensation. In his contribution of 
11 October 1979 to the debate on the land issue, Lord Carrington,36 stated that:
1. We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will 
wish to extend land ownership. The Government can of course purchase land for 
agricultural settlement, as we have all seen. The Independence constitution will make 
it  possible  to  acquire  under-utilised  land  compulsorily  provided  that  adequate 
compensation is paid.
2. Any  resettlement  scheme  would  clearly  have  to  be  carefully  prepared  and 
implemented to avoid adverse effects on production.
3. The Zimbabwe Government might well wish to draw in outside donors such as the 
World  Bank in  preparing  and  implementing  a  full-scale  agricultural  development 
plan.
4. The British Government recognises the importance of this issue to a future Zimbabwe 
and will be prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources to help. We 
should for instance be ready to provide technical assistance for settlement schemes 
and  capital  aid  for  agricultural  development  projects  and  infrastructure.  If  an 
agricultural development bank or some equivalent were set up to promote agricultural 
development including land settlement schemes, we would be prepared to contribute 
to the initial capital. 
5. The  costs  would  be  very  substantial  indeed,  well  beyond  that  capacity,  in  our 
judgement,  of  any  individual  donor  country,  and  the  British  Government  cannot 
commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should however be ready to 
support  the  efforts  of  the  Government  of  Independent  Zimbabwe  to  obtain 
international assistance for these purposes. 
34 See http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimbg2.htm (visited 15/11/02)
35 British South Africa Company
36 See http://www.gta.gov.zw/Constitutional/Lancaster/lord_carrington.htm (visited 15/11/02)
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Nonetheless, an agreement was reached and the Patriotic Front announced it as follows:
We have now obtained assurances that … Britain, the United States of America and other 
countries will participate in a  multinational  donor effort  to assist  in land, agricultural and 
economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great 
concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for 
land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in government.37
Those sympathetic to President Mugabe’s land grab policy often cite three reasons why the 
resettlement programme did not perform as envisaged under the Lancaster House Agreement 
of  1979.  First,  under  the  willing  seller/willing  buyer  principle,  land  was  not  offered  in 
sufficient bulk to the government. Secondly, that which was offered to government was the 
poorer quality  land in  regions of  low rainfall  patterns and poor ecological  soils.  Thirdly, 
because of the ‘fair market price’ clause, the government was greatly constrained and there 
have not  been sufficient funds forthcoming to buy the land.  But  probably the reason lies 
elsewhere.38
In 1980 President Mugabe’s government hosted the Conference on Reconstruction 
and  Development  (ZIMCORD)  in  a  bid  to  mobilise  international  support  for  inter  alia, 
finance for resettlement. With hindsight, this began President Mugabe’s post-independence 
campaign for victim status in Zimbabwe’s land saga. The impression given then was of a man 
determined  to  cure  the  land  mischief  in  Zimbabwe  without  upsetting  property  rights  of 
beneficiaries  of  the  land  alienation  project  begun  at  the  colonisation  of  Zimbabwe  and 
sustained by successive colonial governments until 1980. Britain, West Germany, the United 
States of America and others participated. The aid promised at both Lancaster and ZIMCORD 
trickled in but not with enough strength to knock out the hunger for land that has lasted for 
over  a  century now among the  native  Zimbabweans.  Thus,  after  the  first  seven years  of 
independence only 40,000 families of the original 162,000 families targeted for resettlement 
had actually been resettled. In fact,  apart from the British Government, which provided £44 
million, no other donors have funded land acquisition. In 1990, British aid to Zimbabwe for 
this  purpose  was  suspended.39 The  British  government’s  promise  to  the  Patriotic  Front 
alliance of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU at Lancaster House in 1979 
to provide the wherewithal to purchase from commercial farmers land for resettlement of 
landless native peasants had saved the negotiations from collapse. President Mugabe insists 
that  but  for  the  donors’  unilateral  repudiation  of  the  agreement  to  fund  resettlement  of 
landless peasants in Zimbabwe, the murders, torture and forcible repossession of formerly 
commercial farms would not have occurred – a victim status claim. The British government’s 
claims that  but for  President  Mugabe’s government’s abuse of  the money it  provided for 
resettlement  of  landless  peasants,  it  would have stuck to  its  Lancaster  House Agreement 
pledge to fund land redistribution in Zimbabwe – another victim status claim. Its claim for 
victim status originates in the idea of public accountability. Ultimately, public office bearers 
in Western democracies are accountable to the electorate and taxpayers. The Public Accounts 
Committee is one of many British Parliamentary committees that police administrative action 
to ensure transparency that fights corruption in public office.  The degree of  transparency 
achieved  determines  the  level  of  governmental  accountability.  President  Mugabe’s 
requirement  that  the  British  government  surrenders  huge  sums  of  money  to  his  own 
government and at  the same time relinquishes all  interest  in ensuring that the object  and 
purpose of that exchange is followed through illustrates the falsity inherent in cooperative 
agreements between developed and developing States that, because cooperation is desired in 
37 See http://www.gta.gov.zw/Land%20Issues/factsheet.htm (visited 15/11/02)
38 Absence of a joint UK/Zimbabwe supervisory organ to oversee implementation of the 
compensation/resettlement mechanism as demonstration of the parties’ mutual commitment to the 
agreement in 179 to maintain private property rights in the independent Zimbabwe. Discussed in detail 
infra.
39 See “How Mugabe abused backing from Britain”, The Times, 19th April, 2000, p.5.
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order to achieve a  particular  outcome, it  will  be achieved as a matter  of  course  once an 
agreement has been reached. It is not just their economies that distinguish them as developed 
and developing countries, but also their governmental, social and cultural practices. This fact 
should  be  acknowledged  in  all  cooperative  agreements  between  Northern  and  Southern 
countries by creation of accountability mechanisms that will ensure that Western participation 
is  not  sapped  by  practices  that  are  not  acceptable  to  their  own  practices  and  culture  of 
accountability.  
Nonetheless,  failure  of  the  compensation  for  resettlement  mechanism  agreed  at 
Lancaster  House  undermines  a  fundamental  principle  of  international  law  –  pacta  sunt  
servanda. It manifests also difficulties that two member States of the Commonwealth States40 
have been experiencing for some time now in the effort to repair their faith in each other. It 
demonstrates  that  transient  necessity  is  never  a  good basis  on which to  premise  cardinal 
decisions  of  a  constitutional  nature.  Agreement  about  the  land  resettlement  mechanism 
appears  to  have  served  two  very  different  purposes.  The  immediate  and  perhaps  more 
pressing one was the sustenance of the conference. That was important for everyone involved 
though the British government might have wanted it more than anyone else because as many 
have argued, it  was they more than anyone else that were responsible for the situation in 
Rhodesia. Those same voices still insist that having authored the land crisis in Zimbabwe 
through its colonial adventures, Britain must now fund land redistribution every inch of the 
way. 
The distant and perhaps more remote one but whose moment is at hand was the actual 
implementation of the agreement. There is a case for saying that these purposes did not carry 
similar weight for the Patriotic Front Alliance of Mugabe and Nkomo on the one hand and the 
British  government  on  the  other.  Although the  British  government  proceeded to  actually 
implement  that  agreement,  there  is  no  doubt  it  was  always  the  former  purpose  of  the 
agreement that mattered because of all those that initially promised to fund that agreement, 
only Britain stood equal to its promise. This suggests that Western emphasis might have been 
on achieving a result at Lancaster rather than not. Therefore, the compensation/resettlement 
mechanism was a tactical necessity to keep the talks on track. It could be kicked into touch 
once the overall  purpose had been satisfied.  However,  for  the Patriotic Front  Alliance of 
Mugabe  and  Nkomo it  was  implementation  of  the  mechanism that  mattered  rather  than 
sustenance of negotiations for  a settlement.  For  them, this  was a matter  of  constitutional 
magnitude. 
Had  the  parties  perceived  the  mechanism  as  contingent  necessity  based  upon  a 
futuristic  goal  of  mutual  importance,  then  they both  might  have fought  harder  to  ensure 
success of its implementation because of the mutual disadvantage failure would inflict on 
them both. In their contest for the status of ultimate victim, neither the British government nor 
President  Mugabe’s  ZANU  (PF)  government  thinks  that  they  have  lost  anything  in  the 
consequent crisis. It is not exactly clear what the British government’s loss is in the collapse 
of the mechanism. However, President Mugabe’s loss is quite apparent. The argument can be 
made that without the donor’s aid President Mugabe is a cornered man.  Starring right into his 
face is the objective of the liberation struggle, which was to regain land taken away from the 
native population - it is said. President Mugabe as leader of a post-colonial government has a 
duty it seems to fulfil the promise for which so many young lives were lost. That is difficult 
to contest. Also starring into his face is the reality of landless peasants on whose backs the 
struggle  for  political  independence was waged.  These hardened veterans  cannot  wait  any 
longer for a share of what they believe to be rightfully theirs, and for which they waged a a 
guerrilla war to recover. President Mugabe knows that for far too long now, his government 
has fed them on the tranquillising pill of gradualism. However, they now appear to have worn 
off its effects and simultaneously developed immunity to it. Now, even President Mugabe 
knows that they can wait no longer. Figure 1 below illustrates the problem. 
40 A coalition of States of the former British Empire.
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Figure 1: When  balancing interests requires more than good will.
In  this  sense  the  agreement  to  proceed  on  a  willing  seller/willing  buyer  basis  becomes 
procedurally cumbersome and practically unnecessary because of the attendant problems. If 
the  unilateral  decision  by  the  United  Kingdom  government  to  withdraw  support  for 
Zimbabwe’s  land  redistribution  passes  for  breach  of  a  contractual  agreement,  then,  there 
might  have been a case for  saying that President  Mugabe’s government could regard the 
whole compensation for resettlement regime as at an end. The farm invasions suggest that. 
Breach of fundamental terms of a contract by one party can in certain circumstances entitle 
the innocent party to regard the contract as at an end.41 This is the view taken by President 
Mugabe  in  his  speech  of  17  September  1993  to  the  ZANU (PF)  Central  Committee. 42 
However,  this  raises  the  issue  of  which  between  the  parties  is  innocent  and  entitled  to 
withdraw from the previous agreement. The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (1969) 
has similar provisions where the agreement constitutes a treaty, which is what the Lancaster 
House  agreement  can  be  regarded  as,  notwithstanding  the  Patriotic  Front  status  as  an 
insurgent group and not itself a State. 
(ii) Britain, victim or agent?
The  United  Kingdom  government  has  always  insisted  that  the  Zimbabwe  government 
provoked  breach  and  suspension  of  the  contract/agreement  by  using  the  compensation/ 
resettlement  regime  to  transfer  ownership  of  private  commercial  farms  from  white 
commercial farmers to a few “friends” of ZANU (PF’s), with only cosmetic resettlement of 
41 See Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. For commentary on 
consequences of breach of contract see McKendrick, E. (4th edn. 2000) Contract Law, Macmillan, 
London, pp.383-93.
42 See President Robert Mugabe’s address to the ZANU-PF Central Committee meeting held Friday 
September 17, 1993 http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/zimbabwe/politics/mugabe.html 
(viewed 20/11/02)
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landless  peasants  that  genuinely  need  land  to  live  off.  Therefore,  argues  the  British 
government:
1) the Zimbabwe government is not a victim of Britain’s breach of the agreement that 
established the compensation/resettlement mechanism, but a responsible activist and 
creator of its own “victimisation”;
2) its good faith in the implementation of the mechanism is evidenced in the more than 
£40 million pounds that it has already provided President Mugabe’s government for 
compensation of commercial farmers and resettlement of peasants in need of land to 
live off.
Because it is accountable to the British taxpayer, and because it did not agree to a scheme of 
transferring land ownership from a few white commercial farmers into the hands of a few 
friends  of  President  Mugabe’s  government,  but  to  the  landless  peasants,  the  British 
government could not continue to fund what it had not previously agreed to, and what it had 
not advised its taxpayers about. In this sense, the British government is the victim of an initial 
breach  of  the  agreement  by  President  Mugabe’s  government.  It  would  be  naïve  to  end 
discussion of the matter here. The British government is as much an agent as it is a victim in a 
radical victimology sense. Even if the abuse that it alleges against the Zimbabwe government 
could be proved, the British government would still remain an agent of the fraud it complains 
about and which it seeks to rely upon to shake off its responsibilities under the Lancaster 
House  Agreement  (1979).  The  UK  is  no  new  comer  to  such  agreements,  or  their 
implementation. Before it had released even one penny to President Mugabe’s government, 
the British government could and should have established together with the Zimbabwean 
government,  a  joint  implementation  committee  to  oversee  the  mechanism’s  work.  Since 
implementation of the mechanism was going to cost a lot of money, the British government 
had every opportunity to ensure that the same standards of transparency that it would review 
its decision whether or not to continue with the agreement were applied. Moreover, it was 
dealing here with a government of very inexperienced public administrators who had just 
come out of a sixteen-year civil war. To surrender over £40 million pounds to a new and 
inexperienced government with the expectation that everything would work out as planned is 
at best ambitious. The problem of implementing policy is as real one for all States and more 
so for transitional States. Even after more than twenty years in power, President Mugabe’s 
government  is  still  dismally  inept  at  implementing  its  own  policies.  Civil  servants  are 
reported to be stifling latest attempts to redistribute land by stealing land confiscated from 
commercial  farmers.  In  December  2000,  Zimbabwe’s  Local  Government  and  Housing 
Minister  Ignatius  Chombo  told  about  7  000  delegates  during  a  closed  session  of  the 
ZANU(PF)  special  congress  in  Harare  that  the  thefts  which  were  so  serious  were  being 
carried  out  by  senior  officials  and  threatened  to  derail  President  Robert  Mugabe’s  land 
resettlement  programme.43 Therefore,  where  agreements  are  concluded  that  set  up 
mechanisms for land redistribution, parties ought also to establish joint supervisory organs 
that  supervise  implementation  of  those  mechanisms,  very  much  the  same  way  as  States 
habitually establish organs that supervise States compliance with human rights instruments 
that they have agreed to be bound by.44 This is because these mechanisms are joint and not 
individual enterprises requiring for their setting up, and therefore their implementation, the 
joint  effort  of  sovereign independent  States.  It  is  presence of  supervisory organs in  such 
enterprises that signifies the benefactor’s commitment to the agreement.
 Commercial farmers: victims or agents
43 See “New twist as Bob’s fat cats grab land”, 
http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/2000/12/17/news/news02.htm (viewed 20/112002)
44 Discussing these human rights supervisory organs see Chigara, B. (2002) Amnesty in International 
Law: Legality under international Law of National Amnesty Laws, Longman, 127-62.
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In  his  address  of  17  September  1993  to  the  ZANU  (PF)  Central  Committee,  President 
Mugabe rehearsed the historical, moral legal and constitutional position of the commercial 
farmers regarding the land issue as follows:
The issue of land has become a matter of great dispute between ZANU(PF), on the one hand, 
and the colonial settler farmers on the other. What is really at stake and is being disputed by 
the settler farmers who are taking the matter to court, is not the issue of compensation, but the 
very  right  of  Zimbabwe’s  Government  to  acquire  land  from  them  and  re-allocate  it  to 
impoverished landless communal people. They argue that the land belongs to them and is, 
therefore, beyond the Land Acquisition Act, for it is in fact this Act that they are challenging, 
not so much from the point of view of the mode of its implementation as from that of its 
constitutionality. They hope that through court action, they can freeze our land resettlement 
programme, if not completely kill it. …….
It is land they have, and on that reckoning, held illegally all along and not under any title from 
our ancestors. If it is argued that the fact of conquest and defeat can transfer title, and actually 
did transfer such title, in 1893 and 1897 and thereafter, then it can similarly be argued that the 
fact of their defeat by us in 1980 has the equivalent effect of re-transferring the land title to the 
Blacks. Perhaps this is how we should have argued our case and acted. We have been far too 
decent. If White settlers just took the land from us without paying for it, we can, in a similar 
way, just take it from them without paying for it, or entertaining any ideas of legality and 
constitutionality. Perhaps our weakness has been that we have tried to act morally and legally, 
when they acted immorally and illegally. 45
Central  Committee  statements  are  a  good  source  of  the  ruling  party’s  directions  to 
government. It is from them that governmental policy derives. The exhaustion of President 
Mugabe’s patience with an obstinate and incorrigible section of his population that refuses to 
participate  in  common  nation-building  endeavours  is  clear  from  his  speech.   So  is  his 
determination  to  ensure  respect,  promotion  and  protection  of  the  dignity  of  the  landless 
peasants  whose  livelihood  depends  on  ownership  of  sufficient  quality  land.  There  is  no 
dignity in being landless if one’s only means of survival is working the land. In his 2002 
Heroes’ day address, President Mugabe re-stated that those commercial farmers that wanted 
to pursue their farming careers in Zimbabwe had nothing to fear so long as they subscribed to, 
and practiced humwe.46 Humwe has been described as the philosophy of commonality, which 
required  the  sharing  with  your  needy  neighbour/countrymen  of  that  which  was  in  your 
custody but not in use in order to preserve the dignity of both the recipient’s and the sharer. 
Humwe’s distributive  effect  is  most  needful  to  undo  social  injustices  rooted  in  colonial 
experience of SADC States. 
The reluctance of commercial farmers to release land held by them in excess, while others 
go  without  is  difficult  to  justify  particularly  because  of  the  history  of  land  acquisition, 
ownership and distribution in  affected SADC States.  Resort  to  judicial  challenges  of  the 
constitutionality of applying humwe is morally reprehensible in situations where international 
law clearly suggests that the legal titles of those in current possession of the land that must be 
redistributed are equivocal. If this is right, then commercial farmers’ claims to the status of 
“ultimate victim” are hollow and difficult to justify. Commercial farmers’ claim to be victims 
of President Mugabe’s land grab policy after the suspension of the compensation/resettlement 
mechanism is compromised generally by the practice of some among their number of:
45 See extract from President Robert Mugabe's address to the ZANU-PF Central Committee meeting 
held Friday September 17, 1993 
http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/landow/post/zimbabwe/politics/mugabe.html (viewed 20/11/02)
46 See “Address by his Excellency the President Cde. R.G. Mugabe, on the occasion of the Heroes 
burial of  Dr. B.T.G. Chidzero and Heros day Commemoration, National Heroes Acre, Harare, 12 
August 2002 at  http://www.zanupfpub.co.zw/campaign2002.html (visited 20/11/02) 
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1) Concealing  and  exporting  their  grain  produce  under  cover  of  darkness  to 
neighbouring  Zambian  and  South  African  markets,  only  for  the  products  to  be 
imported  back  into  Zimbabwe  at  a  higher  price.47 Transfer  pricing48 sabotages 
economic growth. It does not suggest commitment of those involved to the interests 
of  Zimbabwe.  The government  responded to  this  practice  with legislation,  which 
listed as controlled products that had to be sold or delivered by commercial farmers to 
the country’s Grain Marketing Board all those crops that had been involved. Section 
33 of Chapter 18:14 of the Grain Marketing Act (1996)49 makes it an offence to “sell 
or otherwise dispose of any controlled product within the prescribed area except to 
the Grain Marketing Board except in a few cases authorised under subsection 8(35). 
Section 33of the act  states  in  paragraph 2 that  “Any controlled product  which is 
required to be sold to the Grain Marketing Board in terms of this section shall be 
delivered  to  the  Grain  Marketing  Board  at  such  time,  at  such  place  and  in  such 
quantities as the Board may direct and under such terms and conditions as the Grain 
Marketing Board may provide in  any rules  made in  terms of paragraph 2 of  the 
Schedule.”
2) Sabotaging food supply by deliberately switching en mass from growing staple food 
products to red chillies, roses and other exotic crops for export is hardly consistent 
with humanitarian morals. The ICJ stated in the Corfu Channel case that there is a 
duty to warn others of any danger that they might expose themselves to if they relied 
upon  safety  that  was  always  assured  but  can  now  not  be.  This  amounts  to  a 
humanitarian duty to do unto one’s neighbour what one would wish others to do if the 
roles  were  reversed.  Although  this  related  to  duties  among  States,  an  analogous 
reasoning is that commercial farmers have known always of their duty to meet the 
food requirements of their nations unless nature failed them. English law incorporated 
this principle even where parties were not in a contractual relationship. In Donoghue 
v  Stevenson,50 Lord Atkin  stated:  “The  rule  that  you  are  to  love  your  neighbour 
becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, who 
is my neighbour? Receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions, which you can reasonably foresee, would be likely to injure your 
neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons 
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts 
or omissions which are called in question”. The choice by the commercial farming 
community to switch from producing essential food crops to exotic crop farming was 
deliberate, and at a time when their government was amending land rights and access 
to land in order to ensure equity in the distribution of land among all its peoples. They 
very well knew, or must have known the effect on the general population of their 
decision to substitute these exotic crops for maize production, just as they must have 
known the effect on the whole nation of concealing their grain produce in haulage 
trucks that then transported it  to Zambian and South African black markets under 
cover of darkness.
3) Pursuing racial segregation through establishment of exclusive clubs for the provision 
of  social,  recreational,  health,  education  and  other  amenities  in  a  country  that  is 
seeking to heal social injustices of an apartheid era could not be said to be consistent 
47 See “Zimbabwe government sharply increases crop prices” 
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/b2fec572410d2851c1256cf6003d932d?OpenDocument (visited 
15/06/03)
48 See generally, UNCTAD (1999) Transfer Pricing.
49 Seehttp://www.jutastat.com/CGI-
BIN/om_isapi.dll?clientID=1700010&advquery=Grain%20Marketing%20Act&infobase=stzi&record=
{125}&softpage=Doc_Frame_Pg42&x=19&y=17&zz= (visited 20/11/02) 
50 [1932] AC 562 at 580.
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with needs of the State.51 My interview of an insurance clerk who wished to enhance 
his earnings by changing employment revealed a shocking and enduring trait of racial 
supremacy among the commercial farming community that is acknowledged by other 
white employers. At the end of his interview X was told that he could have the job on 
one condition, i.e. that he understood that at this firm, “the customer is king!” When 
he appeared immediately to accept that principle, the interviewing officer told him 
that “X did not quite understand what he meant”. But X insisted he did, and he was 
happy to work on that principle. The officer then told him what he meant by  ‘the 
customer is king!’. “Our clientele comprises mostly of the farming community. You 
will be their first point of contact in your role as claims clerk. They will walk past 
you, shouting things a like ‘What is that monkey doing behind a computer! There are 
no branches to swing on there are there? When that happens, simply refer them onto 
us.” X asked what compensation the company had in mind for that sort of trouble. 
None, he was told. “Take it or leave it!” X rejected the offer.52 
  
Similar resistance to embrace the new national aspirations in post-apartheid SADC States is 
evident  also  among  sections  of  the  South  African  commercial  farming  community.  For 
instance, the right-wing Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) challenged in the Land Claims 
Court in Randburg, Johannesburg the State’s right to expropriate land for its land reform 
project. The TAU applied to the court for an order which if granted would severely restrict the 
State’s  right  to  expropriate  land  for  resettlement  of  landless  peasants.  The  Minister  of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs Thoko Didiza opposed the TAU application. The NLC launched 
a separate application as a friend of the court in support of Didiza’s bid to oppose the TAU 
application. The State’s right to expropriate land in the public interest, including redressing 
the  legacy  of  apartheid  land  dispossession,  is  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed  under  the 
Constitutional Property Rights clause (Section 25). In another case, the SANDF applied to 
prevent  the  return  of  land  now occupied  by  the  Lohatla  Battle  School  to  the  Gatlhose, 
Maremane and Khosis communities. The Gatlhose and Maremane communities were forcibly 
removed  from  the  land  in  1977.53 Mugabe54 justifiably  argues  that  this  nerve  of  the 
commercial farming community that benefited directly from the injustices of apartheid  to try 
and employ the legal system to defend the morally indefensible points to the bankruptcy of 
moralising with them. And if the law should be used to that service, then it too would lose its 
legitimacy.  Therefore,  in  a radical  and positivist  victimology sense,  very often,  when the 
commercial farmers appeal for the status of victim, the finding is likely to be that their alleged 
victimiser is actually their former victim who is now stiffening up his back to ensure that the 
commercial farmer does not continue to abuse them. It can be argued that those commercial 
farmers  that  blindly  reject  pursuit  of  humwe philosophy  in  post-apartheid  SADC States, 
particularly in relation to access to land - itself a injustice of the legacy of colonialism and 
apartheid, are victims of a curse that the International Human Rights Movement is totally 
opposed to, i.e. racism. They refuse to work with others, including their government to create 
a  society  where  everyone  has  equal  opportunity  for  self-actualisation  regardless  of  their 
background. They refuse to learn that “Like life, racial understanding is not something that 
51 Mugabe writes that:  “Because of their attitudes, we in Zimbabwe are a sad tale of two cities, the 
non-racial one we espose and the racial one they espouse. Observe the situation in the commercial 
farming sector and you will see (them) running exclusive clubs, playing exclusive games, striving all 
the time to maintain theirown exclusive schools and other amenities.” See “Address by his Excellency 
the President Cde. R.G. Mugabe, on the occasion of the Heroes burial of  Dr. B.T.G. Chidzero and 
Heros day Commemoration, National Heroes Acre, Harare, 12 August 2002 at 
http://www.zanupfpub.co.zw/campaign2002.html (visited 20/11/02)
52 Interview with Tim Mutamiri, formerly Administrative Assistant, Phoenix Prudential Assuranze 
(Zimbabwe). Account of his experience with Farming and Industrial Brokers (Zimbabwe) , formerly 
known as AGI.
53 See “Post-apartheid land reform hangs in the balance” at 
http://www.nlc.co.za/pubs/pressstatement0218jun.htm (visited 21/11/02)
54 Supra.
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we find but something that we must create. [Therefore] the ability of blacks and whites to 
work together, to understand each other, will not be found readymade; it must be created by 
the fact of contact”.55 The International Human Rights Movement seeks to provide that ‘fact 
of contact’ necessary for the human race to face its biggest foe: racism. Slavery, colonialism, 
apartheid, the First World War, the Second World War and other human catastrophes have all 
been sponsored by racism.
Conclusion
Whenever disputes arise, stakeholders appear to invest as much energy in fighting their case 
in the forum where they hope it will be resolved, as in trying to win support or approval of 
significant others for their position. The prize of the latter campaign is the badge or seal of 
“ultimate victim”. Pursuit  of that badge has enormous potential to influence the dynamics 
observed in the effort to resolve the original problem. This article examined the basis and 
dynamics of the contest for the status of “ultimate victim” in the SADC’s land issue. The 
SADC’s land issue is an example of past and continuing social injustices that are rooted in 
colonial  experience of  States.  It  applied both radical  and positivist  victimology theory to 
analyse  both  the  practical  and  theoretical  issues  that  arise.  It  showed that  almost  all  the 
stakeholders  in  the  SADC’s  land  issue  are  victims  as  much  as  they  are  agents  of  their 
victimhood primarily because of the weaknesses inherent in the assumptions on which they 
base their  claims for  victim status.  Analysis of  those assumptions reveals a dynamic that 
opposes rather than facilitates realisation of the common advantage required to resolve issues 
of social injustice. Therefore, their claims to the status of “ultimate victim” are unsustainable.
Pursuit  of  the  status  of  “ultimate  victim”  is  important  to  stakeholders  because  it 
confers on the one who clinches it, a bargaining chip against the one that misses it. The loser 
or “aggressor” loses moral legitimacy and normally feels compelled to concede more ground 
than he was initially prepared to.  Therefore, it is vital currency for those involved in any 
dispute. Nonetheless, pursuit of the “victim status” may divert attention of stakeholders from 
the real issue. It may inflame the negotiating atmosphere, particularly where the significant 
others whose sympathies are sought are renowned “big” players. In such cases, positions may 
harden and focus lost of the primary issue.  Stakeholders may lose track and control of events 
that depict the primary issue, allowing for corruption of the main problem to the extent that 
more effort, time and resources will be needed than before, to resolve the whole problem. 
This may confuse the issues between the parties, placing farther behind, the possibility of 
resolving the problem.  Therefore, parties to disputes engage in the pursuit of the status of 
ultimate victim at the real expense of finding a solution to their initial problem.
This  article  showed that  “the  inherent  dignity”  of  all  concerned was the  ultimate 
victim” and that only it deserved protection.  Humwe’s candidature for the task of placating 
the mischief at the heart of the SADC land issue was strengthened by its potential to resolve 
the problem while at the same time upholding the inherent dignity of all stakeholders. Its 
human  rights  and  social  justice  pedigree  appeared  to  oppose  the  commercial  farming 
community’s claims of the status of “ultimate victim”. However,  humwe’s  distributive and 
human rights qualities alone are not enough constructively to dispense with the land issue in 
the SADC. Its application will need to be complemented by measures that will restore fully, 
the  peasant/communal  farmer  to  a  position  that  enables  each  of  them  to  enjoy  similar 
opportunities with regard to distribution and exploitation of their nation’s primary resource - 
land. 
55King, C.S. (ed. 1983) The Words of Martin Luther King, Fount, London, p.33.
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